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JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MICHAEL MURPHY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NOS. 43119, 43121
JEROME COUNTY NOS. CR 2006-555,
CR 2014-5175
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Murphy pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and
concealment of evidence. The district court sentenced him to fourteen years
imprisonment, with six fixed years, for the possession offense and five years
imprisonment, with all five years fixed, for the concealment offense, to be served
concurrently. At the time of these offenses, Mr. Murphy was on probation. The district
court revoked his probation and executed the underlying sentence of twenty years, with
ten years fixed. Mr. Murphy now appeals the district court’s order revoking probation
and judgment of conviction, contending that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing excessive sentences.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On August 23, 2006, Mr. Murphy pled guilty to trafficking in immediate precursors
of methamphetamine, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732B(5). (43119
R.,1 pp.165–66, 175–77.) The district court sentenced Mr. Murphy to twenty years
imprisonment, with ten years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (43119 R., pp.175–81.)
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Mr. Murphy’s
sentence and placed him on probation for seven years, beginning on April 9, 2007.
(43119 R., pp.190–93.)
Mr. Murphy was sober for almost seven years until he relapsed and used
methamphetamine in late 2013. (43119 R., pp.213–15.) On April 21, 2014, the district
court found that Mr. Murphy violated his probation by using methamphetamine and
extended his probation for three years.2 (43119 R., pp.230–31, 244–48.)
On October 18, 2014, Mr. Murphy got in an altercation with law enforcement at
his residence after he tried to swallow a plastic baggie of methamphetamine.
(Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),3 pp.4–5, 27.) Law enforcement found
additional controlled substances and drug paraphernalia at his residence. (PSI, pp.4–5.)
On October 20, 2014, the State filed an Amended Complaint alleging that

This is a consolidated appeal. Citations to the clerk’s record are made with reference
to the Supreme Court case number.
2 On January 27, 2014, Mr. Murphy admitted to a probation violation for the use for
methamphetamine. (43119 R., pp.211–15, 230–31.) For this violation, Mr. Murphy had
the opportunity to participate in Drug Court. (43119 R., p.233–39.) Despite his initial
interest in the program, see 43199 R., p.233, his counselor Anna Stowe discouraged
him from participation. (43119 R., p.306; Tr., p.35, L.25–p.36, L.13.) She apparently told
him “it was not something he needed and that it was too much ‘punishment’ for a
relapse.” (43119 R., p.306.)
3 Citations to the PSI refer to the 90-page electronic document titled “43121 Murphy
Conf Exhibits.”
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Mr. Murphy committed the crimes of: (1) resisting and/or obstructing officers, a
misdemeanor, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-705; (2) possession of drug
paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2734A; (3) two counts of
battery on a police officer, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-915(3) and -903(a),
(b); (4) possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, a felony, in
violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(a); and (5) destruction, alteration, or concealment of
evidence, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-2603. (43121 R., pp.19–27.) The
State also filed a motion to revoke Mr. Murphy’s probation based on his written
admission of using methamphetamine and his arrest for the instant charges. (43119
R., pp.259, 268–70, 276.)
On

November

7,

2014,

the

magistrate

held

a

preliminary

hearing.

(43121 R., pp.51–57.) With respect to the charge of possession with the intent to
deliver, the magistrate found no intent and bound Mr. Murphy over to district court for
possession only. (43121 R., pp.57–58.) On November 19, 2014, the State filed an
Information Part I, which charged Mr. Murphy with possession of a controlled
substance, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), along with the other
allegations from the Amended Complaint. (43121 R., p.65.) The State also filed an
Information Part II, claiming that it intended to seek an enhanced penalty as a persistent
violator pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2514 and, alternatively, an enhanced penalty
pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-2739. (43121 R., pp.66–67.) The State later filed an
Amended Information Part I, amending the two felony counts of battery on a police
officer to misdemeanors. (43121 R., pp.112–14.)
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Mr. Murphy and the State entered into a plea agreement. Mr. Murphy agreed to
plead guilty to possession, concealment, and the two battery misdemeanors.
(Tr., p.4, L.19–p.5, L.22, p.14, L.19–p.16, L.11.) The State agreed to dismiss the
remaining charges and the persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., p.4, L.19–p.5, L.22,
p.14, L.19–p.16, L.11.)
On February 10, 2015, the district court held a hearing on a change of plea and
the State’s motion to revoke probation. (Tr., p.4, Ls.7–12.) In accordance with the plea
agreement, Mr. Murphy pled guilty to possession, concealment, and the two
misdemeanors. (Tr., p.21, L.5–p.25, L.19.) He admitted to violating his probation.
(Tr., p.26, L.22–p.27, L.19.)
On March 30, 2015, the district court held a sentencing and revocation hearing.
(43121 R., pp.128–30; 43119 R., pp.297–99.) The district court revoked Mr. Murphy’s
probation and executed the underlying sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed.
(Tr., p.41, L.24–p.42, L.5.) For the possession offense—with the enhancement under
Idaho Code § 37-2739—the district court sentenced Mr. Murphy to fourteen years
imprisonment, with six years fixed. (Tr., p.42, Ls.14–21.) For concealment offense, the
district court sentenced Mr. Murphy to five years fixed imprisonment. (Tr., p.42, Ls.22–
25.) These sentences would all be served concurrently. (Tr., p.43, Ls.2–5.) The district
court entered a judgment of conviction and order on motion to revoke probation. (43121
R., pp.131–38; 43119 R., pp.300–03.) Mr. Murphy filed timely notices of appeal. (43121
R., pp.148–50; 43119 R., pp.309–11.)
On April 9, 2015, Mr. Murphy moved for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 for his sentences for possession and concealment. (43121 R., pp.144–
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46.) The district court denied his motion without a hearing. (43121 R., pp.157–59.)
Mr. Murphy also moved for reconsideration of his sentence for the probation violation,
which was also denied without a hearing. (43119 R., pp.305–07, 318–20.)
ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of fourteen
years, with six years fixed, upon Mr. Murphy, following his guilty plea to
possession and concealment?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Murphy’s probation
and executed the underlying sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Murphy’s motions for
reconsideration of his sentences?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Fourteen
Years, With Six Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Murphy, Following His Guilty Plea To
Possession And Concealment
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an

appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Murphy’s
sentences do not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. §§ 37-2732(c)(1)
(possession), -2739(a) (enhancement); 18-2603 (concealment). Accordingly, to show
that the sentences imposed were unreasonable, Mr. Murphy “must show that the
sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of
the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
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“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)). “In examining the
reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent review of the entire
record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal
punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.” Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In this case, the district court sentenced Mr. Murphy to fourteen years, with six
years fixed, for possession and five years fixed for concealment, to be served
concurrently. (43121 R., pp.131–38.) Mr. Murphy asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing excessive sentences. Specifically, he contends that the
district court should have sentenced him to lesser terms of imprisonment in light of the
mitigating factors, including his substance abuse issues, amenability to treatment,
acceptance of responsibility and remorse, positive employment history, and supportive
family and friends.
Fifty-eight-year-old Mr. Murphy grew up in Montana. (PSI, p.14.) When
Mr. Murphy was thirteen years old, his older brother committed suicide. (PSI, pp.13, 44.)
A few months after his brother’s death, Mr. Murphy asked his father about his brother.
(PSI, p.44.) His father told him that he wished that Mr. Murphy had killed himself instead
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because he “was a piece of shit.” (PSI, p.44.) Mr. Murphy dropped out of school after
the seventh grade. (PSI, p.16.) He moved to Jerome, Idaho, in the 1980s. (PSI, p.14.)
Mr. Murphy first used cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana around the age of twelve
or thirteen. (PSI, pp.18–19, 47–8.) He eventually stopped using these substances, but
he began using methamphetamine in his twenties. (PSI, pp.18–19, 47.) By his thirties,
Mr. Murphy was injecting methamphetamine daily. (PSI, pp.19, 47–48.) Mr. Murphy’s
substance abuse issues, the impact of his substance abuse on his behavior, and his
need for treatment are strong factors in favor of mitigation. A sentencing court should
give “proper consideration of the defendant’s [substance abuse] problem, the part it
played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for
treating the problem.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance
abuse on the defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of
punishment upon sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Here,
the GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary (“GRRS”) diagnosed Mr. Murphy
with “Amphetamine Dependence w/ Physiological Sx. – In a Controlled Environment.”
(PSI, p.65.) Mr. Murphy reported in the GRRS:
I was doing so well in recovery and thought I could use just one [sic] in a
while I started in the summer and it got out of control even quit my job. I
had been on the job for 7 years got employee of the year twice. I can’t
believe I did this.
(PSI, p.73.) He also expressed “a desire to discontinue his use of illegal substances.”
(PSI, p.19.) Mr. Murphy submits that the district court abused its discretion at
sentencing by failing to consider adequately his interest in treatment and his substance
abuse issues, which caused his criminal behavior.
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Despite the fact that Mr. Murphy’s substance abuse issues are the cause of his
criminal behavior, Mr. Murphy has accepted responsibility for his actions and expressed
remorse. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of
mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). During the presentence
interview, Mr. Murphy described the crime as: “I Relapsed and Had meth in my
possession and a couple of Officers came to my house and when I Tried To Swallow
the meth. We got IN a pushing match.” (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Murphy told the presentence
investigator that he felt “EMBARRASED and Ashamed OF MYSELF for my actions in
now I’ve Hurt my Family and Employer.” (PSI, p.6.) He made similar remarks at
sentencing, stating,
I’d just like to apologize for the choices that I made. I know they were bad
and that consequences -- you know, bad choices can lead to great
disasters in your life, and I apologize to my family and the community and
the Court for being in this situation. I know that I can do this. And this
[Reformer’s Unanimous] program is just a great program. I love the
program and the people in it. And they tell me they got a great success
rate on people that complete this program, and I plan on -- and I’m very
close to completing it, and there’s another stage to it that Doug and Keith
says that there is, and I plan on continuing in this, you know, program with
my wife if given the opportunity to do so.
(Tr., p.39, L.12–p.40, L.1.) These statements of acceptance, remorse, and regret stand
in favor of mitigation.
In addition, Mr. Murphy was employed before his relapse and then worked in
Jerome County Jail upon his incarceration. (PSI, p.19; Tr., p.37, L.24–p.38, L.2.) He had
been employed with Jerome Cheese since February of 2008. (PSI, pp.16–17.) At
Jerome Cheese, Mr. Murphy was awarded employee of the year twice. (PSI, p.17.) He
stated in the presentence investigation that he “is striving to receive a promotion and
continue working for Jerome Cheese.” (PSI, p.17.) He also stated that “sobriety and
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employment” are important to him. (PSI, p.19.) Mr. Murphy submits that his positive
employment history supports a lesser sentence. See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115,
118, 289 P.2d 315, 317 (1955) (recognizing gainful employment as a mitigating factor);
see also Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (recognizing employment and desire to advance
within company were mitigating circumstances).
Finally, Mr. Murphy has a supportive family and community to assist him with his
recovery. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (recognizing family support as mitigation); see
State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App. 2010) (considering family and friend
support as mitigating circumstance). Mr. Murphy reunited with his family once he
became sober. (PSI, pp.19, 33, 35; Tr., p.36, Ls.19–23.) He reported in the presentence
investigation that he would attend Alcoholic Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous
meetings through his church if released into the community. (PSI, p.13.) His sister-inlaw wrote a letter to the district court, stating:
I believe Mike needs to remain very close to God—he does well
when going to church, surrounding himself with good, hard-working,
committed people to our Lord. He enjoys bible studies, church family life
etc.
I am hoping Mike can get back to work, take care of his family and
stay very connected to people who want good things while alive on this
earth. Drug court, probation, checking in with people who only want the
very best for Mike Murphy . . . . I only want great things for this man.
(PSI, pp.33–34.) She also attended his sentencing in his support (Tr., p.36, L.23–
p.37, L5.) Similarly, Mr. Murphy’s brother-in-law wrote:
He believes in God and attends church when sober. He has had 7½ years
of sobriety prior to this slip. He has done sober before, and done it well. I
totally believe he can do it again with assistance and support . . . . If his
health survives a prison sentence, he will then be released jobless and in
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poor health.4 How he will ever recover from those strikes seems
impossible to me. It seems a far better plan to allow Mike the opportunity
to acknowledge his addiction and take steps to return to life as sober,
productive citizen . . . . I pray the Court will be lenient in its sentencing and
allow Mike the opportunity to address his drug addiction.
(PSI, p.35.) His brother-in-law also wrote of Mr. Murphy’s good character when sober.
(PSI, p.35.) Another unsigned letter described Mr. Murphy as caring and “a great
person.” (PSI, p.36.) The support from Mr. Murphy’s family and community stands in
favor of mitigation.
In summary, Mr. Murphy submits that these mitigating factors support a lesser
sentence for the charges of possession and concealment. By failing to sufficiently
consider these factors, Mr. Murphy submits that the district court imposed an excessive
sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Murphy’s Probation And
Executed His Underlying Sentence Of Twenty Years, With Ten Years Fixed
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation
under certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a twostep analysis to review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho
102, 105 (2009). First, the Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms
of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated
the terms of his probation,” the Court examines “what should be the consequences of
that violation.” Id. The determination of a probation violation and the determination of
the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.

For the past two years, Mr. Murphy has been treated for Crohn’s Disease. (PSI,
pp.18, 66.)

4
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Here, Mr. Murphy does not challenge his admission to violating his probation.
(Tr., p.26, L.22–p.27, L.19.) “When a probationer admits to a direct violation of her
probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required.” State v. Peterson,
123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Rather, Mr. Murphy submits that the district court
abused its discretion by revoking his probation.
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation
and pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy,
113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily,”
however. State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). “The purpose of probation is to
give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and
supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In determining whether to
revoke probation a court must consider whether probation is meeting the objective of
rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127
Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may consider the defendant’s conduct before
and during probation. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987).
In this case, Mr. Murphy submits that the district court erred by revoking his
probation because his probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. Mr. Murphy
had spent close to seven years on probation without a violation. (See 43119 R., pp.192,
213–14.) He had been working at Jerome Cheese for about seven years as well.
(PSI, pp.16–17.) He was awarded employee of the year twice, his performance was
good, and he was eligible for rehire. (PSI, p.17.) He participated in church and had
positive relationships with family and friends. (PSI, pp.33–35; Tr., p.36, Ls.14–25.)
Unfortunately, like many individuals struggling with drug addiction, Mr. Murphy relapsed
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in late 2013. But, Mr. Murphy took responsibility for his actions and re-committed to
rehabilitation. For example, he explained in the presentence investigation that he would
attend “Reformers Unanimous,” stay in contact with his sponsor, and become more
involved in the community to avoid future charges. (PSI, p.20.) By the time of the
sentencing and revocation hearing, he had completed ninety percent of the Reformer’s
Unanimous Ministries program. (Tr., p.37, Ls.13–23.) Three founders of the program
were willing to be his sponsor. (Tr., p.37, Ls.18–21.) In Jerome County Jail, he reached
out to other inmates to “talk to them about the importance of getting sober and his
regrets in not taking the drug court offer in this case.” (Tr., p.38, Ls.3–7.) In addition,
Mr. Murphy made use of his time in jail as an inmate worker. (Tr., p.37, L.24–p.38, L.2.)
In light of these facts, Mr. Murphy submits that the district court’s decision to impose the
underlying sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed, for his second probation
violation—the sole cause of which were his substance abuse issues—was an abuse of
discretion.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Murphy’s Motions For
Reconsideration Of His Sentences
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903
(Ct. App. 2014). In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must
“consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the
reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The Court “conduct[s] an independent
review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the
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offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276
(Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence
under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule
35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). In this case, Mr. Murphy
moved for reconsideration of his sentences for possession and concealment and his
probation violation. (43199 R., pp.305–07; 43121 R., pp.144–46.) In these motions,
Mr. Murphy informed the district court that he continued as an inmate worker, remained
clean and sober, and was amenable to treatment. (43119 R., p.306; 43121 R., p.145.)
In light of this new information, Mr. Murphy submits that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motions for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Murphy respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district
court for a new sentencing and probation revocation hearing.
DATED this 15th day of September, 2015.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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